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The Policy Challenge of Artificial Intelligence 
 
James Bessen 
 
The new technologies of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” promise to bring 
dramatic social and economic changes. Already, machines can drive cars, they can 
outperform humans at analyzing X-rays and playing games, and a host of new materials and 
3D printing are changing manufacturing. Commentators have raised concerns that these new 
technologies may destroy jobs or reduce wages, perhaps creating social and political 
upheaval. Also, these new technologies will surely bring challenges to intellectual property 
(IP) and antitrust regulation, including concerns about the ownership of Big Data and 
privacy, the ability of anyone with a 3D printer to become a manufacturer by downloading 
designs off the Internet and more.  
Yet to a great degree, the role of IP and antitrust in the new era will be a 
continuation of their role in today’s technologically advanced sectors. And here the news is 
not all good, particularly in regard to information technology (IT). Across all major sectors 
of the economy, large firms are becoming more dominant in their markets and IT is a major 
reason for this. Leading firms in each industry are able to use proprietary IT systems to gain 
market share at the expense of smaller rivals. This might not seem like bad news, especially 
for the shareholders of large firms, but it is evidence of a slowdown in the spread of 
technical knowledge throughout the economy. The result is not only rising industry 
concentration, but also slower average productivity growth and growing wage inequality.  
Perhaps the biggest challenge that new information technologies may pose to 
IP/antitrust policy is their effect on the diffusion of knowledge. The “Progress of Science 
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and the Useful Arts” depends both on the development of new innovations and on the 
spread of related knowledge so that new techniques can be used widely. Both IP law and 
antitrust law pay heed to balancing these concerns, balancing innovation incentives against 
the need for disclosure and competition, balancing concerns about market power against 
considerations of efficiency.  
The current trend of rising industry concentration implies that this balance has been 
lost with regard to information technology and policies are not sufficiently encouraging the 
diffusion of knowledge. While technical factors such as economies of scale and network 
effects surely contribute to the growing dominance of large firms, the policy challenge is to 
offset this trend. To date, IP and antitrust policy have not been doing enough and they 
might be making things worse. Moreover, emerging information technologies, most 
importantly machine learning, may well exacerbate these problems.  
Rising industry concentration 
Industry concentration has been rising across sectors in the US since the 1980s. 
Autor et al. (2017) find that from 1982 to 2012 the share of shipments made by the top four 
firms in four-digit industries grew 4.5% in manufacturing industries, 4.4% in service 
industries, 15.0% in retail industries, and 2.1% in the wholesale sector.1 What is driving this 
change and what is its significance? 
Some see rising concentration as a sign of decreasing competition that might lead to 
higher prices, less innovation, and greater wage inequality.2 This view is bolstered by 
evidence of a concomitant rise in profit margins and markups (Rognlie 2015, Barkai 2016, de 
                                               
1 See also White and Yang (2017) on trends in aggregate concentration. 
2 The Economist, “Too much of a good thing,” March 26, 2016. 
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Loecker and Eeckhout 2017). Figure 1 shows the recent rise in profits. The black line, also 
drawn from the National Accounts, represents the ratio of the net operating surplus to gross 
value added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the ratio of 
aggregate operating income after depreciation to revenues for firms publicly listed in the US. 
Rising profit margins might also be a sign of declining competition. 
However, that is not necessarily the case. The interpretation depends on what is 
causing the rise in industry concentration and firm profit margins. Declining competition is 
one possibility. Grullon et al. (2016) attribute the rise in industry concentration partly to lax 
antitrust enforcement of mergers and acquisitions. Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) suggest 
that growing federal regulation might be creating entry barriers, also reducing competition. If 
these views are right, then perhaps antitrust enforcement needs to be strengthened or other 
policy changes made to increase competition. 
The productivity gap 
But another possibility is that some firms—but not all—benefit significantly from 
new technologies. That is, top firms may be growing larger and taking greater market share 
not because of mergers or cartelization, but because they are more productive and are thus 
able to lower prices or provide greater quality products and services.  
Concerns about rising industry concentration and its effects are not new. Starting 
with Demsetz (1973), economists recognized that high industry concentration might be a 
sign of superior performance rather than an indicator of insufficient competition. In the 
1970s, Peltzman (1977) documented rising concentration in manufacturing industries, but he 
argued that these increases were largely the result of technological progress, and therefore 
antitrust authorities need not be concerned. Scherer (1979) attributed the increases largely to 
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economies of scale, arguing that antitrust authorities could distinguish genuine scale 
economies from attempts to limit competition through acquisition where they could perform 
their valuable role. 
Something similar seems to be happening today. Thanks to new technology, top 
firms earn higher profits and realize larger market share, hence higher concentration. In a 
careful analysis, Autor et al. (2017) find strong evidence that market share is being 
reallocated to “superstar” firms that outperform rivals; they are more productive hence they 
grow faster. In this case, the superior performance of these leading firms might result from 
greater innovation and might produce greater social benefit. But what might cause the top 
firms to grow faster? The authors speculate that the underlying cause might actually be greater 
competition caused by globalization or better comparative price information made available 
by the Internet or other technology. In their model, greater competition, captured by an 
increase in the elasticity of demand, increases the market advantage of more productive 
firms.  
Yet greater competition does not seem to entirely explain the reallocation. For one 
thing, if greater competition were driving the rise in industry concentration, we might expect 
this effect to be greatest in those industries most affected by global trade. The evidence, 
however, suggests that industry concentration is increasing across almost all sectors.  
But there is another factor that seems to be affecting the market share of superstar 
firms. Several studies point to a growing divergence in firm productivity within industries; 
the gap between the top performing firms and the rest is growing (Andrews et al. 2016; 
Berlingieri et al. 2017, Decker et al. 2017). Thus, resources might also be shifting to top firms 
as their relative productivity grows. 
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Figure 2 shows the annual growth rate of revenues per employee for publicly listed 
firms in the US breaking out the performance of the 50 largest firms from the rest. From 
1980 through 1999, the productivity of the largest firms grew at about the same rate as the 
productivity of the rest of the firms. But from 2000 through 2014, the productivity of the 
largest firms grew substantially faster. This meant that the market shares of the largest firms 
increased substantially because revenues per employee increased.  
IT and large firms 
But what is driving this productivity gap? New evidence is emerging that it is 
substantially driven by new information technology systems. This might seem 
counterintuitive because many basic components of information technology—low cost 
personal computers, pre-packaged software, networking hardware, etc.—are available off-
the-shelf to both large firms and small firms. Indeed, for this very reason it has been argued 
that IT “levels the playing field.”  
But there are different types of IT. While putting word processors on desks is not 
likely to generate competitive advantage, that is not the case with proprietary mission-critical 
IT systems. Firms have heterogeneous abilities to develop cutting edge IT systems because 
they have managers or software developers with different abilities. Also, software 
development typically requires large upfront fixed costs but has low marginal costs. Because 
of this cost structure, IT systems can have large economies of scale. In addition, some IT 
systems might exploit network effects. For example, Hughes and Mester (2013) see both 
fixed IT development costs and network effects in payment systems contributing to 
substantial scale economies in banking. Similarly, IT systems have helped Walmart achieve 
more efficient logistics, higher turnover of inventory, and greater product variety at lower 
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cost. And the huge investments in IT systems needed to design and manufacture jumbo jets 
has put this market beyond the reach of all but Boeing and Airbus. 
These proprietary IT systems used by large banks and Walmart and Boeing are 
crucially different from the general use of IT because they provide competitive advantage. 
By contrast, for example, many restaurants use off-the-shelf point of sale systems. These 
provide improved service but, because these systems are also widely available to competitors, 
they are not likely to provide a substantial competitive advantage that allows a restaurant to 
gain substantial market share. But firms with successful proprietary systems might well grow 
faster than other firms in the same industry. Proprietary IT thus provides a specific 
mechanism that can help explain the reallocation to more productive firms, rising industry 
concentration, also growing productivity dispersion between firms within industries, and 
growing profit margins.  
When the scale economies and network effects of proprietary systems are particularly 
strong, they may give rise to “winner-take-all” or “winner-take-most” markets. For example, 
IT platforms enable Amazon to dominate the market for online retail. But that does not 
appear to be the situation in most industries. While industry concentration has been rising 
across all major sectors, most industries have cannot be accurately characterized as “winner-
take-most,” for example, the top four firms capture the majority of revenues in just over a 
quarter of six-digit NAICS industries.  
Nevertheless, rising industry concentration is a general concern and empirical 
evidence finds a major role of IT in this trend. There is a large literature on why productivity 
varies substantially between firms in the same industries. Some research specifically finds 
that the growth in the dispersion of productivity and wages is at least partly accounted for by 
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information technology (Abowd et al. 2007; Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997; Dunne et al. 
2004).  
A key question is why information technology should be associated with widely 
disparate levels of productivity. While the hardware components of IT systems are usually 
generic commodities, the systems themselves typically involve proprietary software and 
complementary human or organizational capital. There is a significant literature that 
identifies IT-related differences in productivity arising from complementary skills, 
managerial practices, and business models that are themselves unevenly distributed. Skills 
and managerial knowledge needed to use major new technologies have often been unevenly 
distributed initially because much must be learned through experience, which tends to differ 
substantially from firm to firm.  
Recent empirical research makes three major findings: 
1. Industry use of IT systems is associated with higher industry concentration ratios 
(shares of sales to the top firms) and with more rapid growth in concentration 
ratios (Bessen 2018). The effect is large—it accounts for most of the observed 
rise in concentration ratios. Moreover, an instrumental variable analysis provides 
evidence that the relationship is causal, that is, investments in IT systems caused 
the increase in industry concentration.  
2. IT systems use is strongly associated with the growth in operating profit margins 
of publicly listed firms in the US from 2000 to 2014 (Bessen 2018). Relatedly, 
Calligaris, Criscuolo, and Marcolin find that digitization is associated with rising 
firm markups (the premium of prices over marginal cost) for firms in OECD 
nations from 2001 through 2014. Bessen finds that IT systems account for most 
of the increase in operating margins over this period and again, the relationship 
appears to be causal. 
3. It’s the top firms that are benefitting from these trends. Industry use of IT 
systems is associated with larger revenues per establishment and higher labor 
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productivity among the top four firms within each industry, both in absolute 
terms and relative to other firms in the industry. 
 
In contrast, the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that rising 
industry concentration and rising operating margins result mainly from less competitive 
industry structures. Industry measures of merger and acquisition activity and of entry are not 
associated with increases in industry concentration. And once IT and intangibles are taken 
into account, the residual trend in operating margins is not positive, weighing against a 
general decline in competition as the source of the increase in margins. 
Thus, the evidence points to technology and, in particular, information technology as 
a major driver of rising industry concentration. The top firms within industries are able to 
harness the technology to become more productive and to grow faster. In this way they 
come to increase their dominance over markets and to raise their profits. Overall, the 
analysis here suggests that the recent overall rise in industry concentration is not mainly the 
result of anticompetitive activity that should worry antitrust authorities.  
 
The policy challenge 
Of course, this is not all bad news. IT systems appear to bring real economic 
benefits—both to consumers and shareholders—in terms of greater output per worker even 
it does raise industry concentration. While there may be other reasons to question antitrust 
policies (see, for instance, Kwoka 2012), the general rise in industry concentration does not 
appear to raise troubling issues for antitrust enforcement at this point by itself. 
But the rise in industry concentration raises policy concerns nevertheless. The 
growing productivity gap between the leading firms and the rest implies that the efficiency 
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gains from IT are not being shared as widely as was the case with past technologies. 
Increasingly, it seems, top performing firms utilize new technologies productively while their 
rivals cannot. Concentration appears to be rising because of “barriers to technology” if not 
actually barriers to entry. 
But the impact is significant to society. Aggregate productivity growth has slowed 
because the rate at which new technology is diffused has slowed. The decline in productivity 
growth since the late 1990s has been of general concern. Some economists, such as Robert 
Gordon, argue that there has been a slowdown in the rate of innovation. However, the 
evidence noted here about the performance of top firms (e.g., Figure 2) suggests that there is 
no slowdown in their productivity growth. Instead, careful research decomposing the sources 
of productivity growth finds that the much of the slowdown can be attributed to the 
growing failure of productivity growth to spread to most firms (Decker et al. 2017). 
Moreover, the slowdown in diffusion affects wage inequality. Research also shows that more 
productive firms pay more and that a substantial part of the growth in wage inequality is 
associated with growing differences between firms. 
A key goal of IP policy has been to promote the diffusion of new ideas. A key goal 
of antitrust policy has been to reduce barriers so that rivals can compete effectively. These 
goals have always been balanced against the objective of providing strong incentives to 
innovate and to encourage greater efficiency. But the evidence reviewed here shows that 
over the last 15 years or so, that balance has been lost. There has been too little diffusion of 
new knowledge leading to slower productivity growth and greater economic inequality.  
Although IP and antitrust policies might not be the primary cause of the decline in 
diffusion, they should play a role in reversing the trend. The worry is that in some areas 
policy, too, has shifted against diffusion. To the extent that rising use of employee 
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noncompete agreements limits the ability of technical employees to take their skills to new 
firms, diffusion is slowed. Similarly, for extensions of trade secrecy law to cover knowhow or 
the presumption of inevitable disclosure. Patents are required to disclose the technical 
information needed to “enable” the invention, but perhaps these requirements are 
ineffective, especially in IT fields. And if patents are not licensed, they become a barrier to 
diffusion. Perhaps some forms of compulsory licensing might overcome this problem. 
Moreover, machine learning technologies portend even greater difficulties encouraging 
diffusion in the future because use of these technologies requires not only skilled employees, 
but also access to critical large datasets.  
Policy measures to improve the diffusion of knowledge might have the effect of 
reducing innovation incentives to some extent. There is often a tradeoff. However, over the 
last 15 or 30 years, the evidence suggests that innovation incentives have grown stronger 
while the rate of diffusion has slowed. Patenting rates are up dramatically as are rates of 
patent litigation; trade secret litigation and litigation over noncompete agreements are also 
up sharply. These data suggest that the incentives to obtain and enforce IP rights may have 
increased, although this evidence is hardly conclusive. The productivity of the top firms has 
accelerated as seen in Figure 2. Nevertheless, the net result has been that the spread of 
productive knowledge has been substantially restricted from what it was 15 years ago. Fixing 
this problem might require some lessening of innovation incentives. It is also a problem that 
involves multiple areas of IP and antitrust policy; the net economic effect of each cannot be 
properly evaluated in isolation from the overall effect on knowledge diffusion. The challenge 
both today and in the future for both IP and antitrust policy is to facilitate the diffusion of 
new technical knowledge and right now the trend seems to be in the wrong direction.  
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Figure 1. Operating Margins 
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Figure 2. Labor Productivity Growth Among Publicly Listed Firms, US (Compustat) 
 
 
